June 18...Flyvbjerg, Chapters 3-4
Use this space to ask a question that came up while you read Chapters 3-4. It can be pretty much any kind of question, from the specific and technical (e.g., what does it mean when he says X) to the broad and philosophical (e.g., why is economics thought of as the most successful/effective of the social sciences, pp. 43-44). All questions are welcome!
I’ve been thinking a lot about theory lately, and have recognized that it’s an area of weakness in regards to my research agenda and what I have identified as appropriate “next steps” for year two of my doc program. I plan to respond to this in part using in the reading and investigation for our 703 paper. A question that I have after reading about theory in Chapter 4 is based in the six criteria that characterize an “ideal” type of scientific theory. I understand how theory is to be explicit, universal, discrete, and systematic. I struggle with how theory is/should be “abstract,” and also why the characteristic of “complete/predictive” were added as a new addition- I struggle with how these latter terms differ from “systematic” and “discrete.” I assume that I’m missing something and I think that having an example with a familiar application would help sort it out.
ReplyDeleteNicole Peterson
Where does theory exist for a practitioner in education? Chapter 5 states that idea theory is viewed by Dreyfus as having six characteristics. Although it is also stated that these characteristics can never be fully realized, I wonder the extent that practitioners in education can approach the characteristic of “universal.”
ReplyDeleteMy overarching question while reading chapter 4 was, how do we as social scientists achieve all of the fundamental components of a theory: explicit, universal, abstract, discrete, systematic and complete and predictive? It seems it would be incredibly difficult to achieve all of these rules when generating any theory but especially so within the field of social science because of the relationship between theory and the actions and behaviors of people. People are mostly unpredictable so how does one go about generating theories?
ReplyDelete***Kayla
I have one question and one area for discussion.
ReplyDeleteRe: Chapter 4:
Is it possible to fully learn, understand and implement all of the fundamental components of a theory during our time as PhDs? It seems a little impossible but is it important to do in order to become proficient and experts in our own disciplines.
Re: Chapter 3;
Hermeneutics and pre-pardigmatic stages . Can we discuss the connection between the two? I feel like I need a diagram. I ask, because I was immediately paused after reading, " The social sciences have always found themselves in a situation of constant reorganization, characterized by a multiplicity of directions." Then the text proceeds to discuss those various characteristics. I would be interested in how the class synthesized this section.
The possibility and impossibility of social science theory, as described on pg. 47. Huh? As doctoral students, researchers and social scientists are we trying to understand the complexities of theory? We talk so much about turning theory into practice, so the idea of backing up and discussing the theory itself feels contradictory. Create our own theories?
ReplyDeleteAllison
At the end of Chapter 3, the author draws on Foucault, pointing out the inherent tension between the two polarities of human kind; humans are simultaneously meaning-makers and the objects of study. This tension feeds into the beginning of Chapter 4, which argues for elements of an (natural science) theory that must be complete and predictive. This criterion is a sticking point for me--how can social science model itself so fully after the natural sciences so as to make this criterion possible or “true”?
ReplyDeleteIf natural science is based on the collective, implicit interpretations of natural scientists, then why can't the same hold true for social science? (p. 28). Seems to me like one group has historically and to some extent continued to marginalize another group that is seen as less than.
ReplyDeleteI feel like before asking my question I should pledge my allegiance to social sciences and qual research and fighting the good fight, but I digress.
ReplyDeleteChapter 4 is titled "Context counts" and very plainly states that the study of people and interactions can never be normalized because of a million competing conditions and variations. Yet, as social scientists we often try to make connections between related events and see if we can't deduce grand revelations from somewhat connected phenomenon. My questions then is pretty cryptic: What are we even doing? Does it mean anything? I've read a ton of qual research articles that state, "findings may not be generalizable." I wonder if people outside of the academy who read the research sit back like, "what am I supposed to do with these super specific findings about this super specific event."
When I made the decision to come back for my doctorate I was worried I didn't have enough experience in schools. I thought my experiences as just a first year teacher didn't really count. Now I realize that many researchers don't have any experience in public school settings. Further, how many researchers have worked in title one schools? Maybe a passion for research and reform is most important. How does in-school experience support the development of the components for a theory?
ReplyDeleteKelsey, I think the question you pose in your last sentence is a really interesting one. It's something I've also thought a lot about. I think this would generate a fascinating conversation.
DeleteEven though we were warned, the reading was a bit overwhelming. As intense as the reading was, the title of Chapter 3 really stood out to me. "Is theory possible in social science?" I wonder what our answers would have been to this question at the start of 702.
ReplyDeleteAt the end of chapter 4, dualism is mentioned. It made me think about my current experiences with teaching. My teaching world consists of using ABA and Behaviorism. However, through 702 and 703, I have learned more about theories and methodologies. Therefore, I have found myself identifying with other theories in my everyday practice. My question is in social sciences, how often does dualism occur? Does it occur more than we think without thinking about it?
ReplyDeleteFlyvbjerg states, “Not paradigm shifts but rather style changes are what characterize social science: it is not the case of evolution but more of fashion” (Flyvbjerg, 30). Is not the evolution of knowledge gained from natural science also based on trends and information that seemed important enough to test and substantiate at the time? Why is it so important for us to draw an explicit line that differentiates between natural science and social science? In my confusion, I decided to find out mathematics’ place on the science spectrum and learned that it is regarded as a “formal science.” Unfortunately, I cannot say that this search helped. Instead, I now have more questions.
ReplyDeleteAt the end of Chapter 3, the author mentions Foucault's concept of seeing humans in a dual role (meaning givers and "meaningless" objects of study in research). How do we move away from this model of research involving human subjects? How can we create less distance between the researchers and the researched?
ReplyDeleteI've struggled with chapters three and four quite a bit. I seem to understand most of it at the sentence level, but feel a bit hazy when I step back and try to think about how any of this will affect my research moving forward. I am curious if the natural sciences have these same discussions about the place of science? Thomas Kuhn's scheme is claimed to have caused some upset in the place and purpose of natural sciences, but are the questions raised in this book the type of discussion that we are all having as humans asking questions?
ReplyDeleteI'm also a little lost on "double hermeneutics" - Is this simply getting at the ideas we have been discussing that values, bias, and context affect our inquiry?
Page 35 caused me to pause with the statement, "Existing experiments do not clearly point in one or the other direction." What would this look like for an experiment to point to the hermeneutic or rationalist view?
I am pretty lost on Levi-Stauss' theory about gift exchange and how it applies or fits into this argument about social science and context. Perhaps I'm trying to make the metaphor too literal?
The question "must the "science of man" be different from natural science?" Is interesting to me. It makes me wonder about other questions like how can we understand so much about non-human things but not ourselves? How can we advance society if we don't even know what works for society?
ReplyDeleteAmber Brown
DeleteIn discussing the pitting of rules over particularities, of difference versus signs, of natural science over social science, Flyvbjerg argues adamantly against the dominance of one epistemological model over another. He states, “Rather than the ‘either-or’ we should develop a non-dualistic and pluralistic ‘both-and’ “ approach (p. 49). In what ways is the privileging of certain epistemologies in educational research paralleled with the kinds of knowledge development most often supported by policy and programming at the K-12 level? What lies at the heart of the resistance to a “both-and” approach in research and teaching?
ReplyDeleteIn thinking about the importance of context and the arguments that Flyvbjerg about the possibility and impossibility of social science theory, I was interested in the second argument, the hermeneutic-phenomenological. Can social science research ever reach real stability in the face of "people's situational self-interpretation"? I wonder if critical social theories have more stability as they recognize various contexts, multiple truths, different levels of interpretation.
ReplyDelete